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G. R. HALL & R. E. JOHNSON
THE RAND CORPORATION
Economists have usually regarded the situs and dispersion of technology
as exogenous factors, the concern primarily of historians [15]. Although
differential endowments of technology are of fundamental importance
for the central body of economic theory and doctrine, there has been
little attention given to the question of how these differences are estab-
lished or modified. This situation is changing, however. Many recent
theoretical models and empirical studies incorporate the transfer or
diffusion of technology,1 but so far only a few case studies have explicitly
treated the expected benefits that create a demand for someone else's
technology, and the process and costs of meeting this demand [3].
This paper deals with the last topic, the process and the attendant
costs of transferring technology among companies in highly developed
economies. It is a case study of four interfirm transfers to Japan in the
1950's and 1960's [6, 20]. Interflrm transfers are one of many types of
international technology transplantation that are occurring with increas-
ing frequency, but the histories of these four transfers illustrate some
NOTE: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. They should
not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the
official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.
1 Examples include: Behrman [4]; Gruber, Mehta, and Vernon [5];Hirsch[7];
Keesing [13]; Mansfield [14]; Nelson [17]; Nelson, Peck, and Kalachek [16];
Spencer [20]; Vernon [22]; U.S. Department of Commerce [21].306 CaseStudies
general considerations relevant to all types of international movements
of technology.
During the 1950's and 1960's there were numerous international
aerospace manufacturing programs, many of them involving the produc-
tion of complete aircraft, as can be seen in Table 1. From 1950 to 1967,
more than 10,000 sophisticated aircraft, with a market value of over
$5 bfflion, were produced by firms under license from the original
designers.
During this period, Japan was particularly active in acquiring aero-
space technology, most of it from the United States. Their skill in doing
so confirmed the reputation the Japanese have had for over a hundred
years as skilled importers of technology; but economists have too often
merely expressed their admiration for Japanese astuteness and left the
matter there. Sociological and cultural factors are important, of course,
but the relevant issue is how the Japanese actually formulate plans and
proceed to acquire technology. The aircraft manufacturing programs
to be analyzed here show that the process involves difficult decisions
about what and how much technology to acquire and the process by
which it is acquired. Correct decisions importantly affect the success and
costs of international transplantation of technology.
SOME CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
We often speak of technology being transferred or knowledge migrat-
ing, but are seldom precise about the process involved.2 Precision is
important because technology as an abstraction cannot move—things
and people are transferred.
Technology can be transferred in two basic forms. One form embraces
physical items such as drawings, tooling, machinery, process information,
specifications, and patents. The other form is personal contact. Put
simply, knowledge is always embodied in something or somebody, the
form being important for determining the transfer process and its costs.
The process is simpler if knowledge is embodied in purely physical
2 Technology is knowledge or information that permits some task to be accom-
plished, some service rendered, or some product produced. Conceptually, tech-
nology can be distinguished from science, which organizes and explains data and
observations by means of theoretical relationships. Technology translates scientific
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































items. If it is embodied in people's expertise, a personnel transfer may wair
be necessary—often in the form of a technical assistance program.
asingle organization, the process may be more informal: people duc4
simply meet to talk or work together. p
In any case, the ease and cost of transfer hinge on the industrial skill
the recipient already possesses. A firm skilled in the manufacture of airci
some general line of products—voltage regulators,let us say—will this
probably have little trouble in mastering the technology for a new the I
regulator; in turn, the transferring firm will probably find it easy and
inexpensive to impart the required information. The opposite will hold othet
if the transfer entails a substantial advance in the technical level of the shard
new producer. This fact has led us to distinguish among types of informa- this
tion that may be transferred. We refer to these as general, system-
specific, and firm-specific technologies, the
General technology refers to information common to an industry,
profession, or trade. At one extreme this category includes such basic influ*
skills as arithmetic, and at the other such specialized skills as blueprint
reading, tool design, and computer programming. The same general A
knowledge is possessed by all firms in an industry and hence is the
ticket of admission to the industry. ing
System-specific technology refers to the information possessed by a sped
firm or individuals within a firm that differentiates each firm from its that
rivals, and gives a firm its competitive edge. Some of this specific and I
information will have been acquired through engaging in certain tasks the ft
or projects. It comprises ingenious p(ocedures connected with a par- other
ticular system, solutions to unique problems or requirements, and experi- the
ences unlike those encountered with other systems. System-specific tech- marid
nology is when a firm, in manufacturing an item, acquires information the III
that is peculiar to that item. Were any other firm to manufacture that
item, it too would probably obtain the same technology.
Firm-specific knowledge differs from system-specific knowledge in utilizd
that it cannot be attributed to any specific item the firm produces. it
Firm-specific knowledge results from the firm's overall activities. Some other
organizations possess technical knowledge that goes beyond the general the te
information possessed by the industry as a whole; another firm manu-
facturing the same products would not necessarily acquire this same
technology. For example, a firm may have special capabilities in thin- surMI
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may wall casting or metallurgical techniques not possessed by other firms,
-am. and not necessarily attributable to any specific item the firm has pro-
ople duced.
To illustrate the differences among the three types of technology,
skill some of the information required for the manufacture of, say, the F-5
e of aircraft is common to all firms with an aircraft manufacturing capability;
-will this we call general technology. The particular firm that manufactures
new the F-S has acquired some specific information about this system not
and possessed by other firms; thisis system-specific information. Certain
iold other technology is possessed by this producer that other firms do not
the share, but which is not attributable to the F-S (or other specific system);
ma- this is the producer's firm-specific knowledge.
em- The kind of information necessary for performing a certain task, and
the form in which it is embodied, importantly influence the diffusion of
try, technology and its costs. Diffusion and its costs in turn importantly
asic influence the scope or integration of a firm and the barriers to entry
'rint encountered by potential new suppliers.3
eral A firm's willingness to diffuse its technology depends on the form in
the which the knowledge is embodied and the extent to which well-function-
ing markets for technical information exist. Assume thata firm's
y a specific technology is protected by property rights, e.g., by a patent, and
its that perfect markets exist for property rights, for factors of production,
:ific and for the products or services for which the technology is used. Then
tsks the firm should be indifferent as to whether it sells the technology to
)ar- other producers or uses it to produce goods and services. The value of
en- the technology to the possessor should be the same in both cases. If
•ch- markets are lacking or highly imperfect at the product level, however,
ion the firm may be forced to sell the property rights in order to realize a
hat return from them. Imperfect factor markets may mean, on the one
hand, that the firm will be unable to obtain the resources needed to
in utilize the technology "in-house" at prices as low as its competitors', so
:es. it may find the sale of technology relatively more profitable. On the
me other hand, effective competition in the labor market may mean that
the technology is diffused so rapidly that in the absence of recognized
me
3Theliterature on technology and market structures has been more concerned
• with the generation of technology than with diffusion of technology. The literature
.1fl issurveyed and extended in Nelson, Peck, and Kalachek [16, pp. 66—88J.310 CaseStudies
intellectual property rights, the firm has no intellectual capital to sell. whei
If markets for property rights are lacking or imperfect, it may pay the a
firm to use the technology within its own organization. If the technology
is not invested with property rights, the firm cannot sell it, and the best muir
option is to try to keep the information secret and use it within the
firm. In short, the decision to sell technology or utilize it within the firm
depends primarily on the intellectual property system and the perfection
of markets for ideas, factors, and product.4 The
The ease with which a new firm can enter an industry depends on the
considerations just discussed, as well as on the type of technology in
required to be an effective competitor. Established firms may be wholly the p
unable to deter a new firm from obtaining the general technology it needs an
to enter an industry. If this information is publicly available, as in text- locall
books, other open literature, and skills of people in the general labor interf
market, any new firm may be able to master the basic arts with minimum
expense. However, even if general technology is not openly available mark
to a newcomer, existing firms may not try to withholdit from a firm
would-be new competitor. A well-established firm with many rivals may replai
look with equanimity on having another competitor in the industry. It stanti
may be willing to render technical assistance at something like the direct interl
costs involved in transferring the information. A firm with few corn- natiol
petitors, however, may look darkly on the arrival of another one on the
scene and be much less willing to sell technology. As with specific tech- firms
/ . I nology,existing firms are likely to have some control over access and towa1
this may be a competitive barrier that firms try to protect.
These considerations go far to explain why international, interfirm trans4
transfers of technology appear to be more common than intranational,
interfirm transfers. Market position, tariffs, transportation costs, and Therd
marketing costs are undoubtedly more significant internationally. Also, a
"political" considerations are often overriding in determining which inforil
firms will be allowed in a market. Consequently, the international mar-
ket for technology is undoubtedly better developed than national mar-
kets. Internationally, firms often buy and sell technology in situations origint
is easi
4Thisdiscussion abstracts from uncertainty, although in international markets
characterized by imperfect information, uncertainty is a vital determinant of the
extent, nature, and cost of technology transfers. For a discussion of this see Y to
Aharoni [1]. That 1U.S. Space Technology Transfers to Japan 311
sell, where domestically they would invest or do without rather than deal with
the a competitor.
logy These same considerations also contribute to the importance of the
best multinational corporation as an agent of transfer. Internationally, firms
the trading in a market may find it advantageous to establish local facilities
whereas they would not do so domestically in a similar local market
;tion within a nation in which other production facilities existed [22,fl.
The multinational corporation is particularly well suited to technology
the transfer in such circumstances. If it is already exporting to the market
logy in question, it has information about demands, competitive conditions,
the political climate, and so forth. Also, because technology transfer is
an intrafirm matter, the response to a decision to establish the technology
ext- locally may often be quicker and less expensive than establishing an
tbor interfirm market relationship through a multiple-firm program.
Thus, international corporate transfers of technology may involve a
able market transaction in which technology is bought and sold, or a single
n a firm may be integrated in such a manner that the market transaction is
may replaced by intrafirmactivities. Both arrangements have been sub-
,.It stantial during the 1950's and 1960's. Although this study is limited to
rect interfirm transfers, itis important to note that transfers within multi-
3m- national corporations are of equal or greater importance.
the Regardless of their attitude toward general technology, virtually all
firms regard their specific technology as a valuable asset. Their attitude
and toward supplying information to other firms, however, may depend on
whether itis firm-specific or system-specific technology that is to be
irm transferred. If a firm views its firm-specific technology as giving it a
nal competitive edge over its rivals, the firm may be loath to divulge it.
and There is less concern over system-specific technology; in fact, there is
iso, a substantial trade(particularlyinternational)indesigns, process
uch information, and the like. Two factors seem to be at work here. System-
Lar- specific technology is more likely to be protected by patents or other
iar- property rights, or by generally accepted proprietary claims, so the
original possessor has more protection in using the information and trade
is easier. Probably more important, the firm is likely to regard the tech-
ketS nology as relevant only to one particular product. If another firm sets out
to produce a competitive product, it will rediscover the technology.
That being so, the original producer is likely to regard transfer of the
t312 CaseStudies
technology as merely saving the new producer time and expense, rather
than revealing some secret that could have been maintained. Ordinarily,
then, system-specific knowledge is transferred more willingly than are
other types of technology.
The important point is that one firm's willingness to transfer tech-
resea
nology to another will partly depend on whether the technology is
was I
embodiedin a form that can be sold, and upon the financial inducements. bomj
Willingness will also depend on whether the firm views the prospective
recipient as a potential competitor. These factors in turn depend to a
considerable degree upon the kind of knowledge required—that is, Ofl skills
whether it is general, firm-specific, or system-specific. Tb
The process of transfer and its costs also depend upon the nature of The
the technology to be transferred and the form of its embodiment, until
General technology will probably be more costly to transplant than this
will firm-specific knowledge, and firm-specific more costly than system- the J
specific, because the latter is often embodied in patents, designs, draw- {20J,
ings,tooling, and other physical forms. Even when system-specific sevei
information is embodied solely in personnel, the transfer isstill less
difficult than in other kinds of technology, since the task is merely one It
of teaching lessons learned in other ways. a
Firm-specific technology may be embodied both in physical form actis
and in "know-how" resulting from interpersonal working relationships but
within an organization that are in some way difficult to separate from train
the firm as an entity. Firm-specific technology, therefore, can be costly
to transfer. begt
The transplantation of general technology may be the most difficult This
and costly of all,sinceit requires intensive yet broad education in corn
practices and procedures peculiartoan industry. Although these
0 practices may be embodied in manuals and standard operating pro-
cedures,it may stillnecessitate costly experience to master them.




All three types of technology were transferred in the co-production airc
of aircraft by U.S. and Japanese companies. Although the Japanese did
not methodically use these categories in deciding what technology to play
acquire, the categorization helps in understanding their decisions. millI
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EARLY CO-PRODUCTION PROGRAMS ily,
are Japan's impressive World War II aviation industry came to a halt in
1945. The Western Allies prohibited Japanese aircraft production and
ch- research and development activities until April 9, 1952. When the ban
is was lifted, the Japanese had virtually no aircraft capability. Wartime
uts. bombings, earthquakes, and other disasters had destroyed much of the
tive plant and equipment, experienced personnel were retired or working in
o a other fields, and postwar advances in aerospace technology left Japan's
on skills and equipment largely obsolete.
The rebirth of the industry can be roughly divided into three periods.
of The first period began with the lifting of the ban in 1952 and lasted
until about 1954, when the F-86F and T-33A programs began. During
ian this period, the industry concentrated on repair and overhaul work for
the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and the U.S. Air Force
SW-. [20].At the same time, R&D and prototype production took place for
several trainers and liaison planes for the Japanese Defense Agency
.ess (JDA).
)ne In the second period, from about 1954 to 1964, the industry added
a substantial manufacturing effort toitsoverhaul and maintenance
'rm activities. Most of the planes produced were designed by U.S. firms,
but Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd., designed and produced two small jet
om trainers, and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (IHI)
;tly developed and produced the J-3 jet engine. Several R&D programs were
begun that have been important in the third period beginning in 1965.
:ult This period has also included the production of Japanese-designed
commercial aircraft and several new design efforts.
Japan's aircraft industry in the mid-1960's was small, having about
ro- 20,000 employees and above $200 million in annual sales. Over 100
rn firms claimed membership in the industry, but 5 firms accounted for
most of the output. These firms, components of major industrial groups
of zaibatsu, all had license agreements with U.S. aerospace firms, the
ties being shown in Figure 1. The middle column of Figure 1 lists U.S.
aircraft and engine systems manufactured in Japan from 1954 to 1966.
Between 1952 and 1964, the Japanese industry turned out 1,422
planes with total sales prices amounting to $781.7 million ($787.7
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the U.S. Government 27, and domestic civilian customers 206, while
72 went for export and reparations. Manufacturing accounted for about
three-fourths of the revenues earned, and repair and related activity
for the rest.U.S. Space Technology Transfers to Japan 315
Japaneseaircraft manufacturing activity really began in earnest in
66 1957. Between 1957 and 1967, the industry turned out between 100
and 230 aircraft each year. Most were produced under U.S. license,
es but in later years the Japanese were increasingly involved in design
projects. A short-range Japanese turboprop-airliner, the YS-1 1, was sold
in several countries, including the United States. Plans were under
discussion for production of a domestically developed interceptor and
possibly a military transport.
The point is that in a very short period—largely as a result of skillful
importation of technology—the Japanese acquired a small but capable
and profitable aerospace industry. A key element in this accomplishment
was the Japanese Government's sponsorship of military aircraft co-
production programs. Co-production refers to interfirm transfers of
manufacturing technology in which the developer of an item provides
data, technology, and other assistance to enable another firm to manu-
facture the item. The first three such programs were the manufacture
by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) of the North American Aviation
F-86F fighter, and the Kawasaki Aircraft Company (KAC) manufacture
of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's (LAC) T-33A trainer and
P2V-7 antisubmarine aircraft. These programs established the industry
and facilitated the later manufacture of the more sophisticated Lockheed
F-i 04J interceptor.
This study focuses on the costs of transferring the F-104J technology
from the United States to Japan, a program representative of many
corporate transfers of technology between countries with developed
industrial capabilities. To set the stage for this discussion, however, a
brief summary of the earlier programs is in order.
The transplantation of general information about U.S. aerospace
practices, firm-specific information about Lockheed and North American,
and even some system-specific information about the T-33A and F-86F,
had begun even before co-production was instituted. Japanese firms,
including those later involved in the production progress, had contracts
with the USAF for aircraft work; Mitsubishi, for example, had a contract
ile for an inspection-and-repair-as-necessary program for F-86 aircraft.
ut This involved some importation of technology; for example, North
ity American Aviation set up a small technical assistance program to support
MHI. Mitsubishi officials state that both the direct experience with the
4-316 Case Studies
F-86 system and the general familiarity the firm gained with NAA An(
procedures and systems were helpful when the F-86F co-production and
program began. a p
Co-production increased the rate, amount, and kinds of technical
information provided the Japanese by several orders of magnitude. Both be:
North American and Lockheed provided their co-production partners thel
with extensive packages of data about corporate policies and practices, deti
and there were many more contacts between American and Japanese
personnel. For the F-86F program, for example, a group of MHI
officials spent several months during 1956 at North American's facilities
learning about NAA's operations. The data packages furnished contained the•
detailed information about managerial, drafting, and other corporate abj
procedures. (Much of this information was embodied in manuals and tran
statements of standard procedures.)
It is easily seen that abundant general and firm-specific information
was made available; itis difficult to determine exactly how much the witi
Japanese used and how valuable they found it. But discussions with
the U.S. and Japanese officials connected with the programs indicate dat:
that the Japanese airframe manufacturers adopted a considerable body thei
of general aerospace technology and Lockheed and North American u.s
firm-spesific technology. Itis clear that adoption was neither slavish we
nor automatic. The Japanese innovated and adapted many of the basic talk
procedures they adopted [6, pp. 80—89].
On the vendor and subcontractor level, the transplantation of general
and firm-specific technology sometimes resembled that between prime dod
contractors, and sometimes did not. The experience of some firms
paralleled that of MHI and KAC; others apparently possessed all the
general and firm-specific information they were interestedin,and
consequently desired access only to system-specific technology. For
example, it appears that for generators and other electrical systems little intei
technology except system-specific flowed to Japan. is
The transfer of system-specific information about the T-33A, F-86F,
and P2V-7 is easier to analyze. In general, the Japanese received all effo;
product designs and specifications and all process specifications. In
particular, they had the benefit in every case either of the tooling or of
the tool design information used by the developer in his production
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And since important data exist in the notes and black books of foremen
and other production line personnel, these too were collected and made
a part of the data package.
The blueprints, design drawings, and similar data transferred had to
be adapted because of differences between manufacturing practices in
the two countries. First, they had to be "upgraded," that is, made more
detailed, because U.S. toolmakers and machinists are expected to surmise
more than are their European and Japanese counterparts.5 Second, the
data and drawings in the early programs had to be translated into
Japanese and into the metric system. During the peak year (1956) of
the F-86 program, for example, there was a design group at MHI of
about sixty people. They devoted about 70 per cent of their effort to
translating drawings and specifications into the Japanese language and
converting them into the metric system. From this experience MHI was
subsequently able to use the Lockheed drawings for the F-104J program
without translation.
Access to technical information was not a problem. When discussing
data transfers, U.S. aerospace officials were emphatic in saying that
their co-production partners could have access to any document. One
U.S. executive flatly stated, "We were paid to put them in business, and
we gave them everything we had." Nor does the story change when
talking to Japanese executives. When asked if they would have liked
fuller information from their U.S. co-production partners, the Japanese
invariably replied that they had no problem getting blueprints and other
documents.
But what about the kind of information not found in documents?
This "know-how" is usually assumed to be a part of the experience of
men and organizations rather than written records. One pertinent measure
5Thisrequirement illustrates the general problem of adapting technology to
international differences in labor skills, training, and practices. The U.S. machinist
is expected to take more independent responsibility than is his counterpart in other
countries. The revision of U.S. drawings to make them compatible with Japanese
shop practices required a considerable fraction of the U.S. technical assistance
efforts. Another example of necessary adaptation of U.S. practices to Japanese
procedures occurred in quality control. To give their decisions the ring of authority,
and to save face among workers whom they implicitly "criticized," Japanese
inspectors had to be given a higher rank in the corporate organization than their
U.S. counterparts enjoyed. See Hall and Johnson [6, p. 82]. The point is obvious
but vital. Sophisticated technology can seldom be transplanted without adaptation






of the extent to which the relevant aerospace manufacturing technology th
was embodied in people is the technical assistance that was furnished hi
licensees.
For the T-33A program, LAC sent 59 advisors to Japan. Because few
of them stayed the full three years, the total number of man-years spent
by LAC was considerably less than 177. The team included 5 administra-
tors, 1 manager, 1 "leg man," 1 training specialist, 1 personnel man, 8 a
to 10 tooling specialists (who were in Japan for only one year), 10 to
15 manufacturing planners, 2 material procurement specialists, and
production specialists or others with production experience. Lockheed to
hired some members of the group specifically for the program. The M
tooling supervisor, however, was a long-time LAC employee, and Lock-
heed considered it important for the transfer of technology and learning by
to find tooling specialists familiar with Lockheed procedures.
The P2V-7 program also used a team of about 60 technical men and an
about the same number of man-years as the T-33 program. The contract
tei
called for 1,462 man-months of overseas technical assistance; it also
provided 775 man-months of technical assistance in the United States,
and an allowance of up to 78 man-months for short-term and emergency
specialists. th
The NAA technical assistance program was much smaller than the of
LAC programs. No more than 29 employees were in Japan at a time.
Fewer man-months of effort were expended on F-86F technical assist-
ance; less than 400 man-months were expended on the entire program.
Of the 32 people who worked on the F-86F, all had had similar
responsibilities on other F-86 programs. of!
The technical assistance teams were coupled to the Japanese licensees
in different ways by LAC and NAA. Lockheed used what it calls the no
"counterpart system." Each man who went to Japan was assigned a
"counterpart" Kawasaki employee at the supervisor level, and an
interpreter. This system meant that a group of three worked together,
and each KAC employee was able to go up the chain of command pai
until he reached a supervisor with an American counterpart, from whom
he was able to obtain assistance or advice. LAC argues that the best tea
way to succeed in a co-production program is to participate directly in
-U.S. Space Technology Transfers to Japan 319
theproblems of the partner. Indeed, LAC emphasizes that a large,
integrated team is the key to co-production success.
North American did not integrate its team with the MHI organization
nor get directly involved in MHI's activities; instead the team made
nt
itself available for advice upon request. NAA believes that its system
created less friction with MHI, a firm proud of its capabilities and
achievements. The NAA system also required a smaller technical
0
assistanceteam.
to Both methods succeeded, but LAC believes that its procedures led
to better airplanes and better success in meeting schedules. NAA and
ed MHI both hold that schedules and quality were not serious problems
he for the F-86F program and that some of the T-33A assistance provided
by LAC was redundant.
ng These differences in judgment may be due to the fact that the NAA
and LAC technical assistance efforts transferred different kinds of
ad technology. The NAA team was composed of NAA employees of long
ict standing, most of whom had had extensive experience with the manu-
[SO facture of the F-86F. LAC, by contrast, hired some people with aero-
es, space but who had not necessarily worked for Lockheed or
worked with the 1-33 before they went to Japan. This evidence indicates
that NAA viewed the technical assistance requirements as the transfer
he of the technology specific to the F-86F, but that LAC was concerned
le. with transfers of other types of technology as well, a fact which may
st- explain the difference in the sizes of the teams. The implication is that
m. system-specific technology is more susceptible to transfer in written
tar form. General and firm-specific technology, it appears, require a process
of education and occupational training with more personal interaction.
The relative importance attached to general and firm-specific tech-
he nology as opposed to system-specific technology may be related to
a differences between MHI and KAC. When co-production began in
an Japan, MHI was technically a more sophisticated firm than KAC. Thus
er, the difference in the sizes of the LAC and NAA teams may also be
nd partly explained by the difference in the technological base of the two
•)m licensees: the larger the base, the less the general and firm-specific
est technology required. It is extremely difficult to analyze this hypothesis,
m however, because of personal considerations that confuse the data.320 Case Studies
KAC appears to have been more willing than MHI to enter into close
working relationships with U.S. firms. The F-104J program, on which
Lockheed worked with MHI, should provide some basis for comparison,
since Lockheed is the only American company to have worked with
both MHI and KAC. Unfortunately, that information is ambiguous.
MHI felt that LAC preferred Kawasaki as the prime contractor. Suspi-
cions and doubts between the two may have led to the more formal
relationship for the F-104J program than had existed between LAC
and KAC on the T-33A and P2V-7 program. The F-104J program,
then, cannot readily be compared with these earlier co-production
b
efforts. de
Although the amount of general and firm-specific technology trans-
ferred depends on the technology base of the licensee, it also depends
IS I
on the sophistication of the system to be developed. Much of the
technical assistance in the T-33A program was devoted to the transfer t e
of general and firm-specific knowledge. The relativelyarge technical
assistance effort required for the P2V-7, however, to LAC
sources, was due to KAC's need for the system-specific technology its
required for producing a more complex aircraft. prc
get
The time pattern of transfer hai
All programs had the same general schedule. One or more planes of
each model were manufactured and test-flown in the United States, tiol
then shipped to Japan. These were followed by other U.S-manufactured I
aircraft shipped in progressively less assembled form. These "knock-
down" aircraft were assembled by the licensee, who thereby gained
experience in assembly operations. At some point in the program, mat
when the licensee's own assembly tools were completely operable,
knockdowns were replaced by shipments of component parts. As pro- P21
duction tooling was completed, Japanese-manufactured parts entered inte
assembly. Another major milestone was Japanese assumption of full waS
manufacturing responsibility,with U.S.material support primarily U.S
limited to "hardcore" items. Although the U.S. licensor supplied some KA
parts throughout the entire manufacturing stage, these decreased in '1
number and importance as time went on. thol
The contribution of this phase-in procedure to the success of the
co-production programs can hardly be overemphasized. It permitted maliU.S. Space Technology Transfers to Japan 321
ose the Japanese firm to meet relatively tight production schedules while
ich learning from the licensor.
on,
'ith Tooling
us. The provision of tooling may be the most important part of the
p1- transfer process, insofar as the transfer of learning is concerned. It can
nal be argued that a considerable degree of production efficiency is embodied
in the design of the jigs and fixtures used by production personnel,
rn, because tooling design determines the basic physicalrelationships
ion between men and machines. In all co-production programs, either tool
design information or the actual tooling was transferred. Although there
is no way for us to judge the relative importance of these two transfers,
tds provision of one or the other is the primary factor in the transfer of
:he the developer's manufacturing experience to a new company.
fer There was considerable diversity among the programs. For the F-86F
:al program NAA provided Mitsubishi with a complete set of tooling from
its plant in Columbus, Ohio, which was being phased out of F-86
production. MHI had to refurbish some of the equipment, but in
general there was far less toolmaking than starting from scratch would
have required. It is impossible to quantify this statement, since MHI
of was building up its labor force and many people designated for produc-
es tion were assigned to tool building to keep them busy.
eci In contrast to the MHI F-86F program, KAC received only the
master tools required to control interchangeability for the T-33A.6 KAC
ed received copies and plans necessary to reproduce all of the approxi-
m mately two thousand other tools required.
le: Methods used for both the previous programs were used for the
P2V-7 program. KAC made some tools;it also bought twenty-seven
ed international master tooling gauges from LAC to control mating. KAC
all was also given two large shipments of production tooling owned by the
ily U.S. government and no longer needed by LAC. Naturally, this reduced
ne KAC's toolmaking expense considerably.
in The special tooling required for each program was extensive, invo'ving
thousands of items. Some items were manufactured in the United States,
e
6Mastertools or gauges are used to locate specific points on the airframe for
ed maintaining or checking accuracy.322 CaseStudies
but most were produced in Japan from designs, models, samples, and
so forth, provided by the U.S. licensor.7
pi
Parts and manufacturing support
The provision of parts and material support required two activities,
interrelated and yet separate parts of the licensors' contractual obliga-
tions:(1)the provision of knockdown aircraft, component parts,
hardcore parts, and raw materials from the United States, and (2) tech-
nical assistance in developing Japanese sources of supply.
The provision of knockdown assemblies and component parts has
already been discussed as part of the interaction between phase-in and
scheduling activities of production. Supply arrangements for items not p1
produced by the U.S. co-production partner varied in each of the three
programs. Lockheed dealt directly with its subcontractors for KAC. 'II
MHIprocured items for the F-86F program directly from the NAA
subcontractors, but NAA purchased a number of items for MHI that
had been furnished by the U.S. government for the production of the
F-86F. a
Hardcore items—the components, parts, and materials imported from
the United States—were defined by the P2V-7 contract as those items
"beyond the capability of the Japanese industry to produce or
economically unfeasible for production in Japan." Both U.S. and
Japanese sources emphasized the effort made to minimize hardcore items.
The Japanese government was prepared to pay a premium to initiate
domestic production. The U.S. firms assisted the implementation of this
policy by accepting most of the items selected by the Japanese for the
hardcore list. Many items that were furnished as hardcore in the early
programs were produced domestically in later ones, since each program
increased the Japanese aircraft industry's capability. D
The provision of tools, assemblies, parts, and materials by the United
States served a number of ends. It assured international interchange-
ability of certain items.It decreased Japanese production costs by
Much of the technology—and many of the improvements in technology as a in
result of "learning" phenomena—are embodied in tool design and changes to
tooling for sophisticated products. Therefore, the role of tooling in technical
assistance programs and material support deserves close attention. For more dis-
cussion of the tooling and tool designs furnished the Japanese, see Hall and dl
Johnson [6, pp. 94—96, 107—08]. eU.S. Space Technology Transfers to Japan 323
nd furnishing tooling the firms would otherwise have had to build and by
permitting importation of parts that would have been expensive to
produce in Japan. As a result, Japan had to invest only a little less
than $17 million in facilities. Supply by the United States also permitted
es tight delivery schedules for planes to JDA. Most important, manufactur-
ga- ing support permitted the transfer of technology at reasonable cost.8
•ts,
A general observation
Some quantitative features of the three early programs are summarized
in Table 2.Itis harder to summarize the results of the programs.
ad Japan obtained 552 planes for its military forces which it could have
ot purchased from NAA and LAC assembly lines, but we do not know
ee the relative costs of importation and domestic production at that time.
c. Therewere some identifiable direct spilloversas,for example, the
A landing gear on the commercial airliner,the YS-il, whichisan
at adaptation of the P2V-7 landing gear. Yet, in general, these benefits
• are small compared with the basic outcome of the early programs: the
acquisition of sufficient general and firm-specific technology to qualify
m Japan as a producer of advanced commercial and military aircraft.
as
THE F-1041 PROGRAM
S. The three programs previously described above exemplify technology
transfer from an industry with an established capability to an industry
is trying to establish a new capability.9 Mitsubishi's production of the
F-104J illustrates another type of transfer—between two countries with
:y established industries.
n
Description of the program
d On November 7, 1959, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was notified that
it would be the prime contractor for Japanese production of the
y
8Therelationship between extent of domestic production and cost has been
a instructively developed by Baranson in[3] and in an International Bank for
o Reconstruction and Development report [12].
d Although Japan did not have an established aircraft industry, it did have a
substantial and well-developed industrial base. Thus, the early aircraft programs
d differ from technology transfers to less-developed countries in which more gen-
eral technology must be transferred to make a co-production program successful.324 Case Studies
TABLE 2
Japanese Co-production of US. Military Aircraft, 1955—63
Type of Aircraft





Total number of aircraft
involved:
Knockdowns from U.S.
Component parts from U.S.
Fabricated in Japan
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Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, with Kawasaki Aircraft Company as a
major airframesubcontractor.'°Inthe intervening period between
notification and contract effective date, a two-nation agreement was
negotiated, the U.S. financial contribution was determined, a license was
signed between MHI and Lockheed, and several purchase agreements
and contracts were made between the companies concerned. The contract
between Mitsubishi and the Japanese Defense Agency, signed March 31,
1961, initiated the C-i program for the production of 180 F-lO4Js
and 20 trainer planes, called the F-1O4DJ. This program ended March
1965;it was followed early in 1966 by the C-2 program for 30
additional aircraft.
The total C-i program cost about $269 million, of which the U.S.
government contributed $75 million. It involved the Japanese manu-
facture of most of the airframe and J-79 engine components, plus
assembly of some of the electronic items. Three F-104J planes were
manufactured, assembled, and test-flown in the United States; 17 knock-
downs and sets of component parts were manufactured in the United
States and assembled in Japan; 160 F-lO4J planes were manufactured
and assembled in Japan; and 20 F-1O4DJ planes were manufactured
in the United States and should be assembled in Japan. The 30-plane
C-2 program increased the proportion of engine components manu-
factured in Japan and added additional Japanese responsibilities for
assembly and manufacture of electronics.
Dataand technicalassistance
The involvement of U.S. firms can be usefully divided into data,
technical assistance, and material support. In the data category the
most important information transferred to Japan was probably tool
designs. Most tooling was built in Japan from Lockheed designs. The
Japanese imported the master tools from the United States in some
cases; in others, they imported plaster copies from which they made
their own master tools. They also purchased tooling for tricky designs
or parts hard to produce from blueprints alone.
The LAC-MHI license agreement specified a technical assistance
'°About70 per cent of the airframe by weight was manufactured by Mitsubishi
and about 30 per cent of Kawasaki. In dollars, the percentages were 80 and 20,
Horikoshj [10].326 CaseStudies I
programof approximately 1,400 man-months in Japan, paid for by the
U.S. government. The major subcontractor, Kawasaki, also received
LAC technical assistance. The third technical assistance effort of any h
size was between General Electric Company and Ishikawajima-Harima
Heavy Industries Company, Ltd. (IHI) for the production of the J-79 c
engine. General Electric provided thirteen engineers, or about 131 2
man-months, at a total cost of $285,000. Other licensors of parts and ii
components also provided some technical assistance to licensees. a
Much of the technicalassistance involved design changes that h
distinguished the F-104J from the basic F-104. Because the Japanese u
wanted a heavier airframe and better electronics, more manufacturing
technology was required than in the earlier programs. ii
Unlike its experience with Kawasaki, which actively sought technical a
assistance, Lockheed found the Mitsubishi organization much more d
formal. Assistance was requested, but there was not as close a relation-
ship between the two firms as there had been between LAC and KAC.
Indeed, Mitsubishi officials expressed skepticism about the need for
such a large Lockheed technical assistance team. Since the technical
assistance was paid out of the U.S. contribution, however, MHI was
not inclined to protest the size of the effort.
Material support—airframes
The hardcore list for the F-104J reflects Japan's interest in increasing
the capability of her aircraft industry. Subject to total budgetary restric-
tions, everything was built in Japan that could be [10, p. 3].
The budget constraint meant that relative U.S. and Japanese pro-
duction costs influenced the decision as to what technology to acquire.
This fact in turn made the size of the program and rate of production
important determinants of the hardcore list. As an illustration of this
point, the consortium producing the European F-104G, although it
had a larger budget, bought fewer hardcore items and curtailed
importation of many items from the United States earlier in their
program than did the Japanese because the European program was
larger and the rate of production higher than in Japan [11, p. 1194].
Japan already possessed most of the required technology and facilities.
In the opinion of J. Horikoshi, an MHI official during the F-104J
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the nese were limited to chemical milling techniques," the spray-mat process
ed to control icing,'2 and the improved capability to form and handle
high-heat-treatment (4340) steel [10, p. 7].
ma The general qualifications of the Japanese firms are indicated by the
.79 composition of the hardcore lists. The initial hardcore list contained
31 226 items. By mid-1965 this number had fallen to 181. Further, 22
nd items originally procured as finished parts were being shipped to Japan
as rough castings and forgings at this time. The 181 items on the final
lat hardcore list were determined by the three criteria that LAC and MHI
used at their conferences: (1) Capital equipment expense; (2) Project
ng tooling expense; (3) Technical capability. As shown in Table 3, no
item was classified hardcore solely from lack of technical capability;
:al and in fact, for only 10 of the 181 items was this lack among the
)re determining factors.
n- The price breakdown of Table 3, though crude, is revealing. The total
C. cost of hardcore per aircraft was approximately $38,000. The items
or
TABLE 3
'as Items (Hardcore) Acquired From Outside Japan for F-104J Program





Reason for Acquisition Items0—10050010001000
High capital equipment expense(1) 25 19 3 2 1
High project tooling expense (2) 70 42 20 7 1
Technical capability limitations(3) 0 0 0 0 0
Combination ofI and 2 76 27 47 2 0
Combination ofI and 3 0 0 0 0 0
Combination of 2 and 3 3 0 0 3 0
Combination of 1, 2, and 3 7 0 2 4 1








;S. Source: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.
"Produced under a Turco Products, Inc., license.
12Producedunder an English Electric Company (NAPIER) license.
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Lockheed supplied to Mitsubishi were primarily inexpensive; about
half the total hardcore amount is accounted for by items costing from
$100 to $500.
A hardcore list can be extensive for either of two mutually exclusive
reasons: an item may be so sophisticated and complex that its manu-
facture would be difficult and expensive to transfer to another firm;
or an item may be so simple and widespread in application as to be
A
uneconomical to produce except in large quantities. In the first case, E
the high costs of transfer could place the item on the hardcore list. In E
the second case,transfer, although probably inexpensive, might be
unattractive because of the economies of scale. The F-104J hardcore
list reflects economies of scale more than high costs of transfer. The
relatively few expensive items on the F-lO4J hardcore list include the
air intake duct inner skins, radomes, wing skins, fuselage main frames,
fuselage keelsons, empennage beams, and fuselage longerons. Inexpensive
items included because of the economies of scale were mostly small ft
pieces of hardware such as blind rivets and hi-lock bolts.
th
In contrast to the airframe part of the program, most of the expensive
electronics items were imported. As will be discussed later, these items
seem to have fallen into the category of high transfer costs rather than
the second, or economies-of-scale, case.
vi
The extentof technology transfer • .
Thematerial support from the United States raises the question of
how much of the F-104J was really Japanese-produced, or conversely,
how much was merely Japanese assembly of U.S. manufactured items. A
To answer this question, data were obtained from leading Japanese
participants in the program to separate vendor and subcontractor pur-
chases from value added. The sample included five suppliers of air- Fl
frame items, the engine manufacturer, and three electronics companies. rn
One conclusion stands out clearly. The airframe, engine, and elec- itc
tronics firms differed widely in their degree of domestic production.
To understand the role of these three groups, and to provide a
comparison for cost figures to be presented later, Table 4 shows the
average costs for sixty F-lO4Gs purchased in the United States in au
1964 from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. The G version is similar









Source: Based on information provided by the F- i04 System Pro-
gram Office, USAF' on a fiscal year 1964 Military Assistance Program
procurement of approximately sixty aircraft.
alncludes estimated priceson miscellaneous items of government-
furnished equipment.
that the airframe accounts for approximately two-thirds of the cost of
the system, and the engine and electronics for about one-sixth each.
Table 5 presents data on the airframe part of the Japanese program.
MHI, the prime contractor, produced about 80 per cent of the total
value of the airframe. As the major subcontractor, KAC was responsible
for the complete empennage, the forward and aft fuselage sections, and
some other items.
Table 5 divides the MHI and KAC parts of the C-i program among
outside domestic purchases, imports, and the value-added by the firm.'3
About 31 per cent of MHI's purchases and about 33 per cent of KAC's
were imported. Compared with the total cost of manufacture, imports
were about 17 per cent for MHI and about 18 per cent for KAC.
Hardcore items accounted for about 30 per cent of MHI's imports. Raw
material imports were relatively insignificant. Most of the purchased
items came from Japanese firms.
The value-added percentages, 45 per cent for Mitsubishi and 46 per
13 The twenty trainers and twenty knockdowns in which MHI and KAC were
only middlemen for LAC are not shown. The discussion is limited to the 160-
aircraft portion of the program and its related spare parts production. The MH1
figure for the KAC subcontract differs in Table 5 from the total of the KAC
column because it includes the cost of KAC's assembly activity for the 20 aircraft
assembly-only portion of the program.
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Production Experience of Mill and KAC in
160-Aircraft Portion of C-i Program
MHI KACa
Per Per
Item $ MillionsCent$ Millions Cent
Totalitnportsb 19.95 17.1 3.52 18.0
Raw material 1.89 0.71
Parts 12.00 2.81
HardcoreC 6.06
Total domestic purchases 44.64 38.3 7.15 36.4
Raw material 1.32 1.06
Parts 20.48 6.09
KAC subcontract 22.84
Value added by firm 51.94 44,6 8.95 45.6
Total 116.53 100.0 19.62 100.0
aExcIudes spare parts and the assembly work on the first 20 F-104J
aircraft.
bAirframe experience only(excludes MHI import of $23.45 million of
electronics).
°Purchased separately from LAC out of U.S.dollar contribution.
cent for Kawasaki, provide a check on the extent of the technology
transfer. Had the value-added percentages been low, we would have
suspected that the Japanese firms were merely importing U.S.-produced
items and no significant transfer of technology was involved; but the
MHI and KAC figures are about the same as the value-added percentages
for U.S. airframe producers, implying that MHI and KACweremanu-
facturing rather than transshipping the F-104.
Since Mitsubishi purchased about $22 million worth of items from
Japanese firms other than KAC, we must go below the prime-contractor
level and examine the source of inputs for the Japanese vendors in
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TABLE 6
Production Experience of theThreeLargest MH1 Vendors,






Item Co., Ltd. Ltd. Co., Ltd.
Imports 9.5 61.3 32.3
Raw materials 0 0 11.8
Parts 9.5 61.3 20.5
Domestic purchases 14.4 11.9 46.3
Raw materials 5.3 3.4 4.1
Parts 9.1 8.5 42.2
Value-added by firm 76.1 26.8 21.4















to the F-104J. Table 6 shows the production experience of the three
MHI suppliers. These firms, Shinko, Shimadzu, and Sumitomo were
not only quantitatively important suppliers, accounting for a third of
Mitsubishi's purchases, but illustrate three different domestic supply
conditions •14
Shimadzu'sexperience is an example of a supplier that made extensive
use of imports. Over 80 per cent of its sales to MHI were accounted
for by one product—the air conditioning system. Because this compact
14Forfurther information on Japanese subcontractors and suppliers, see Hall
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and sophisticated system was unlike anything the firm had previously prop
manufactured, most of the parts were imported from the U.S. licensor, prof
the Garrett Corporation. Because of this one product, approximately
61 per cent of Shimadzu sales to MHI were foreign product imports. wej
There appears to have been a severe barrier to the transfer of technology, suq
perhaps resulting from the extreme difference in the technological base infd
of the licensor and licensee, because this heavy reliance on imports is
not characteristic of Shimadzu. Under another Garrett license, Shimadzu mol
manufactured an electric actuator. Imports for this simpler item, of
which Shimadzu was an experienced manufacturer, accounted for only froi
17 per cent of total sales.
Sumitomo Precision presents an intermediate case of reliance on Mai
imports. It manufactured landing gear components under a license with ii
Cleveland Pneumatic, with imports accounting for about one-third of poil
the total sales to MHI. At the time of the C-i program, the Japanese chai
industry lacked a capability for forging hard steel (especially forgings
that required large-capacity double-action presses)Manyof the acti
imported items required hard-steel forgings with only modest amounts By
of machining. The relatively heavy reliance on domestic purchases thu
reflects primarily the involvement of Daikin Kogyo Company, Ltd., one J-7
other firm producing landing gear components. 7 ii
The experience of Shinko Electric illustrates the third position on Jill
imports. Note the very low reliance on imports, even though the
products are somewhat complex (voltage regulators, generators, etc.), haI'
manufactured to Bendix Corporation designs. Shinko officials state they
had almost no difficulty in manufacturing the items they supplied. The
reason for importing parts from the United States was primarily corn-
parative manufacturing costs; the imports were not necessarily the most Oflhl
sophisticated parts, and there had been practically no technical inter-
action between licensor and licensee, pro
In short, most of the F-104J airframe was manufactured in Japan, the'
and U.S. imports of finished items accounted for a small part of the air- Offil
framevalue. There was a very gradual and, on the whole, modest decline
in the reliance on imports during the C-i program; and for the C-2 1111
"Japan was also limited in five-axis milling, precipitation hardening, phosphate
Bu! finishing, and nitriding.U.S. Space Technology Transfers to Japan 333
tsly program (for thirty follow-on craft), very little import substitution was
or programmed for MHI, KAC, and the three leading MHI vendors.
Differences among the MHI vendors in their reliance upon imports
rts. were substantial and reflect the differences in the requirements for a
successful transplantation of technology. When only system-specific
ase information is required, transfer is easy and inexpensive even if the
is item is complex and the technology sophisticated. Transfer appears
more difficult for items substantially different from a firm's current
product, with licensees likely to rely heavily on imports of finished items
from their licensors.
on Material support—engines
ith In sharp contrast to the modest decline in imports for the airframe
of portion of the F-104J, the role of imports in engine co-production
se changed dramatically. The first twenty-nine "Japanese" engines (pro-
gs cured by the Japan Defense Agency from the prime contractor) were
he actually supplied from the United States as partly assembled knockdowns.
its By the end of the C-i program, imports accounted for less than one-
es third of the total invoice price. IHI was the prime contractor for the
ne J-79/GE-1 1A engine, with both KAC and MHI as subcontractors. Table
7 indicates the average cost experience for the C-I program, and the
)fl IHIestimates for the follow-on C-2 program. Note the difference
between the C-i and the C-2 programs in the reliance on imports. Over
half the price of an engine can be attributed to U.S. imports in the C-i
program, while in the C-2 program imports were programmed to be less
than one-quarter of the price of the completed engine.
The list of C-2 program imports from General Electric Co. contained
St only a handful of components having unit costs of $500 or more—a
r- small fraction of the number of such components imported for the C-i
program. A few major components were supplied by U.S. vendors, but
the bulk of the imports were "nuts and bolts," in the words of one IHI
official.
Compare the IHI figures with those in Table 5 for MHI and KAC.
2 IHI had a programmed value-added of about 44.2 per cent for the C-2
te
phase,or about the same as that of MHI and KAC for the C-i program.
But note that in the C-i program IHI "in-house" work accounted for334 Case Studies
TABLE 7
11-il Production Experience of J-79 Engines: 160-Aircraft Portion
of the C-I Program and C-2 Program Estimates
Program
C-I C-2














Value added by IHI 44.2
Total 100.0 100.0
Program size in $ millions5 44.39 7.34
aContract information supplied by JDA
only about 35.5 per cent of the total engine price. Domestic purchases
differ even more. For the C-i program only 13.2 per cent of the engine
price was spent on IHI purchases from Japanese firms; comparable
figures for MHI and KAC were 38.3 and 36.4 per cent. IHI's domestic
purchases were programmed for about 31.3 per cent for the C-2 pro-
gram. In other words, IHI's sources of supply for theC-2 program
were about the same as MHI's and KAC's were for the C-i program.
This means that Japan's engine self-sufficiency lagged behind itsair-
frame self-sufficiency by about five years.
Material support—electronics
Most F-104J electronics were not co-produced in the same sense that
the airframe and engine were co-produced. The twenty F-IO4DJ air-
craft and the first twenty F-104J aircraft were completely equipped with
electronics from U.S. suppliers. For the remaining 160 F-104J aircraft
in the C-i program, 160 sets of major items of electronics were imported.















































































































































































































































































































































units, data were assembled on the North American Search and Range Suit
Radar (NASARR) fire control system procured from Mitsubishi Elec-
tric, the stable platform procured from Mitsubishi Precision, and the air mal
data computer procured from Shimadzu. These three items accounted
for about three-fourths of the total cost of the electronics items. (See
Table 8.) Imports accounted for over 75 per cent of the total sales price.
theJapanese corporate officials confirmed that the
Japanese firms had only assembled and tested imported parts.
The relative costs of imports and domestically assembled components ele4
for the electronics part of the F-104J program were high. The average I
unit cost of the completed items imported is about 20 per cent lower than
the cost of the parts for the components assembled in Japan. Table 9 ove
compares the average prices paid by the Japanese government for the litti
components assembled in Japan with the unit costs of complete corn- aco
ponents imported from the United States. Subtracting the value-added ous
in Japan from the unit cost gives the cost of the imported parts used in dut
assembly. The costs of these parts are uniformly higher than the costs
of the completely assembled components imported.
The implication of these data is that the Japanese electronics assembly
part of the program was subsidized by the Japanese government to Jaj
enable Japanese manufacturerstogainfamiliarity with the more
sophisticated electronic products.
TABLE 9












Item Costtity Assemblyin Japan Japantity
NASARR 95.5160 119.4 33.1 152.527
Stable platform 31.5160 36.8 16.5 53.324
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nge Summary of material support data
ec- Some key features of the F-104J program are shown in Table 10. A
air major share of the fabrication of the F-104J took place in Japan, but the
ted transplantation of U.S. technology varied considerably among different
See parts of the program. Most of the airframe was produced in Japan after
ice, the first twenty aircraft were assembled. By 1966 most of the engine
the was produced in Japan, but it took the entire C-i program for the
necessary technology to be transferred completely. Very little of the
nts electronics technology was transferred.'6
ige Through previous overhaul and airframe co-production programs,
an Japanese airframe manufacturers had acquired substantial command
9 over most of the general airframe manufacturing technology. Since very
he little general technology was required, the transplantation was rapidly
accomplished. The airframe situation also appears characteristic of van-
ed ous component suppliers such as Shinko Electric, the generator pro-
in ducer.
sts The electronics situation contrasts sharply with the airframe experi-
TABLE 10
1y
to Japanese Co-Production of the F-104J, 1961—67 —Lockheed-Mitsubishi
re
Total number of aircraft involved: 207
Knockdowns from U.S. 7
Component parts from U.S. 10
Fabricated in Japan 190
Items supplied from U.S.:
Data limited rights and all data
Technical assistance about 60 men
Tooling ii key masters and over 5,000
plaster splashes and Mylar
reproductions. Tooling built
in Japan from U.S. designs.
— Manufacturingsupport selected parts, some engines,
7 armament, most electronics.
16 In dollar terms, the airframe accounted for about 60 per cent of the cost of
— theaircraft, and the other two categories for about 20 per cent each.
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ence. Japan's reputation in the field of commercial electronics might
lead one to expect that the F-104J electronics gear would be manu-
factured in Japan without difficulty. In fact, however, little electronics
manufacture took place on the C-i program. Most major electronics
items were imported from the United States.
The explanation given by Japanese executives is that there are sub-
stantial differences between sophisticated military electronics and the
commercial field in which Japanese firms are experienced—in physical
characteristics and in specifications. This indicates that production of
items such as the NASARR or the stable platform would have required
the transfer of general technology associated with the military electronics
field rather than merely the specific technology associated with the par-
ticular systems.
Through assembly and spare parts manufacturing, the Japanese gen-
erally have been acquiring the general technology of military electronics.
Future aircraft programs should show a pattern in electronics more like
that in the airframe portion of the F-104J program.
The J-79 engine experience tends to support this prediction. Unlike
electronics, the Japanese had had some experience in jet engine produc-
tion at the outset of the C-i program; by the end of the C-i program
the engine was produced almost entirely in Japan. The transfer process
for engine technology took much longer than did the airframe, probably
because the Japanese had had extensive prior experience in airframe
production, which gave them a relatively large stock of general manu-
facturing technology.
The F-104J experience illustrates that the transfer of technology need
not be an all-or-nothing matter. The ability to import parts, supplies,
materials, and technical assistance permits a gradual and partial transfer
of the technology required for an item. This process is well exemplified
by the engine and electronics portions of the program.
The F-104J experience suggests that the ease of transferring manufac-
turing technology for an aircraft importantly depends upon the amount
of general knowledge that must be included in the transfer. If the back-
grounds of the firms are so different that the transfer of general tech-
nology is necessary, a firm is likely to limit its initial activities to assem-
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THEECONOMICS OF TRANSFER
Two classes of costs are incurred when technology is transferred from
one firm to another. First, there are direct costs, or the financial outlays
required to move the necessary technology. Second, there are indirect
ib- costs in the form of increased production costs incurred because manu-
the
: facturing responsibility is divided rather than concentrated at a single
cat point. The direct and indirect costs of the F-104J technology transfer
of will first be considered; then the total cost of producing the F-104J will
ed be compared with that of another F- 104 model produced in the United
tcs States.17
Direct costs
The major direct costs were license fees, royalties, and technical
.5. assistance payments.'8 Considering royalties and license fees first, each
e Japanese producer of a U.S. proprietary item had to make some financial
ke arrangement for manufacturing and data rights. MHI paid Lockheed
$1.5 million plus a royalty of about $31,500 for each of the 160 F-lO4Js
rn manufactured in Japan during the C-i program. These payments followed
the pattern set in the earlier programs.
There were many additional license agreements at the vendor level,
ne usually amounting to about 5 per cent of the invoice price of the
licensee's product, with a modest initial payment or none at all. That
portion of the invoice price represented by parts and materials pur-
chased by the licensee from the licensor was ordinarily excluded from
royalty payments.
er Only occasional reference will be made to earlier programs, since they took
place before Japan had a fully developed aircraft industry.
18 The license between Lockheed and Mitsubishi covered ten years. It provided
for manufacturing rights, development activities, technical data, technical assist-
C- ance, and all warranties. Only items designed by Lockheed were included in the
at license. LAC provided all data required for manufacture, including revisions dur-
I ingthe license term. The assembly of the plane and all LAC-designed items were
warranted, but not items of other firms' design. Mitsubishi had exclusive rights to
1- sell the F-104J, but only to the Japanese government. MHI agreed to pay LAC
$5.8 million to develop the J version of the airframe: a fixed fee of $1.5 million
for the manufacturing rights and data, plus a royalty on each plane made in
Japan, this to be $32,000 for the first plane, dropping to $25,000 on the 201st
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Estimated total royalties on the airframe portion of the program are
shown iii Table 11. Total royalties have been estimated at 5 per cent
of the total work performed by Japanese vendors, or $765,000. This
figure was obtained from Table 5, which shows that MHI's purchases
in Japan were $21.8 million, excluding the KAC subcontract. Approxi-
mately 30 per cent of this amount in turn went to purchases from U.S.
vendors. For the remaining 70 per cent ($15.3 million), we assume an
average royalty payment of 5 per cent. The unit cost figures shown in
TABLE 11







aTechnial assistance of $4.16 million/200 airframes.
bPayment of $1.5 million/200 airframes.
°A\'erage for the first 160 airplanes.
dEstimated as 0.05 x 15.3 million/200 airframes.
eTechnicalassistance of $0.28 million/25O engines.
1Payment of $2.5 million/250 engines.
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are Table 11 were obtained by allocating costs (except for the Lockheed
:ent royalty) to approximately two hundred airframes.bo
For the J-79 engine, $2.5 million was paid by IHI to GE for three
Lses hundred engines on a royalty-free basis. IHI also made royalty payments
xi- to certain GE vendors. These were computed from the data in Table 7,
j s assuming there were no royalty charges for IHI domestic purchases that
were ultimately supplied by U.S. vendors. For the remainder ($4.1
in million) a 5 per cent average royalty was again assumed. These charges
were allocated to 250 engines, the approximate C-i and C-2 production.
Payments for technical assistance have been allocated in the same
fashion as payments for rights. Japanese vendors received minimal tech-
nical assistance from licensors. Those technical assistance programs of
significant size were with MHI, KAC, and IHI.
We are now in a position to examine the direct costs of transfer in
relation to total production costs.2° For this purpose the F-104G costs
shown in Table 4 will be used. According to Table 11, direct costs of
airframe technology transfer amounted to $63,600 per plane or about
8.1 per cent of the total F-104G airframe cost. Direct costs for engine
technology transfer were $11,900 per engine, or about 6.5 per cent of
the comparable U.S.-produced engine cost. Together, these represent
about 7.8 per cent of the total cost of the airframe and engine. Technical
assistance amounted to more than a quarter of the total direct costs of
transfer.21
19 The 200-airframe figure was obtained by adding the 160-unit C-I program
to the 30-unit C-2 program and assuming that the production of a substantial
number of spares in the C-i program was equal to ten complete airframes. The
20 F-1O4DJ's and the 20 F-104J's supplied in the form of knockdowns were
excluded. Because there was little or no Japanese production for these parts of
the C-i program, itis inappropriate to allocate royalties, license fees, etc., to
these planes.
20 No figures are presented for the electronics part of the program, since it is
not clear how much or what type of technology was transferred.
21 The payments for technical assistance differ from the payments for licenses
and rights. The former are payments for a new service—the activities required
to diffuse knowledge. Licenses and royalties, on the other hand, are economic
rents; they are not payments for the production of any new goods or service.
Thus, the "real" economic cost of transfer of technology is less than the nominal
financial costs. Present institutional arrangements, however, give firms property
or quasiproperty rights in the ideas, data, and designs embodied in a finished
system. Transfer requires payments to the owner of these rights in order to induce
them to forego their rights not to disclose their knowledge.
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Indirect costs
Production costs are influenced by the rate of learning and the econo- whicl1
mies of scale. These factors are in turn determined by the rate of pro.-
duction, the volume of production, and the delivery schedule. This rela- reasoj
tionship can be formally stated as
Mliii
C= f(x, V,T, m), milli
where C denotes the cost, x the rate of output, V the scheduled volume pare
of output, T the time output begins, and m the length of the output man-It
period. T and m fix the production period measured from the time the
program begins. Note that there are only three degrees of freedom; the
specification of any three variables fixes the fourth.22 costs
The rate of production is the central variable in the economic litera- plus
ture on costs, while the volume of production is the central variable in figure
the literature on learning or progress curves. Our present concern is not little ii
with the total costs of production attributable to each variable; it is how frame!
these costs vary with the number of producers in a program, and what ture
costs can be avoided when production responsibility is concentrated in
a single firm. To this end we will discuss each variable. persou
The relationship between costs and the rate of production is tradi- work
tionally divided into two parts: the relationship between output and as a
investment in plant and equipment (economies of scale), and the rela- the
tionship between output and variable factors of production (economies In
of plant utilization). Let us consider investment first. Both Lockheed the ml
and Mitsubishi had the factory space and basic equipment required for
F-104 production. Few new facilities had to be added in Japan specifi-
cally for the program. About $10.1 million worth of capital investment $41,OG
in Japanese aircraft capability was designated for the F-104J; private for
investment accounted for about $8.4 million of this total. Most of this could
investment was for the J-79 engine. IHI invested $5.3 million and the therefd
Japanese Government an additional $1.1 million in J-79 engine facilities, more
Tooling costs are more easily attributed to a specific program than It
are plant and facility investment expenditures. The extra tooling costs tion
aco-production program greatly depend on how much tooling is
transferred from the original producer. Usually, this means that the The t4
22 This information and much of the discussion to follow is based on the work some
of Aichian and Hirshleifer [2, 9, 8]. theU.S. Space Technology Transfers to Japan 343
tooling expense attributable to co-production depends on the extent to
which production in the new and old locations overlaps.
fl0 Precisetooling costs for the F-i 04J program are unavailable, but a
'ro- reasonable estimate can be derived from MHI's man-hour figures. MHI
invested about 1.5 million man-hours in the original tooling. (Total
MHI man-hours for all portions of the C-i program were about 7.0
million.) The MHI tooling experience appears reasonable when corn-
me pared with Lockheed's original tooling for the F-104A, about 1.4 million
put man-hours.
the Costing the Japanese tooling expenditure is difficult, but if we use
rn; the Japanese aviation industry rule of thumb, which estimates labor
costs at $3 per hour, we arrive at a tooling cost of about $4.5 million,
ra- plus some allowance for overhead and indirect expenses. Added to this
in figure should be the tooling costs of the other firms in the program, but
iot little relevant information on that is available. MHI did most of the air-
frame tooling, and it appears that the only other major tooling expendi-
lat ture was for the engine, for which no data are available.
in The cost for MHL's tooling is somewhat overstated because some
personnel destined for work on other parts of the program were put to
work building tools. This extra expense, however, is properly regarded
ad as a setup cost that could have been avoided if Lockheed had produced
a- the F-lO4Js.
es In sum, as a rough and probably high estimate, we can attribute to
the investment costs of the airframe portion of the C-i program, $3.7
or million for plant and facilities and $4.5 million for direct tooling labor.
fi- Dividing this total by two hundred planes yields a unit-fixed-cost of
nt $41,000. It was noted earlier that Lockheed sold the F-104G airframe
te for about $789,000 per copy, and it appears likely that the Japanese
is could also have bought airframes from LAC for this price. We may
therefore conclude that the avoidable fixed cost amounted to a little
s. more than 5 per cent of the airframe cost.
In Itdoes not appear that the relationship between the rate of produc-
tion and tooling costs should importantly affect the costs attributed to
is dividing production rather than concentrating it within a single firm.
The tooling for the original producer would have been designed with
some particular rate of production and total output in mind. Transfer of
the program to another manufacturer would not affect the total quantity
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to be bought nor should it affect the rate of production unless the trans-
1
fer required so much time that the total volume for the program could it
not be produced with the originally scheduled rate of production. In
that case, either the length of the production period would have to be
extended or the rate of production would have to be increased. Increas-
ing the rate of production would therefore be a cost attributable to the on
separation.23 The important consideration is the impact of separation as
on scheduling. you
The usual view is that the shorter the period between the start of a
4011
program and the delivery of the first item, the greater the cost. In a
domestic program with a specified volume of production and a specified
rate of production, higher costs can be expected if an early target date An
is established for the first delivery. In international co-production pro-
grams, however, the date of first delivery will partly govern the amount diffd
and type of imports. The earlier the date of delivery, the more knock-
down and component parts will be acquired from the original supplier.
The cost impact will depend on the relative costs of foreign and domes- ulec
tic production. situ
The schedule may affect costs in still another way. The longer the tech
time between the start of a program and the date of first delivery, the dud
less hurried the process of transferring the technology can be. The
direct costs and effectiveness of transfer may be related to the speed of into
transfer. Certainly the phase-in process, previously emphasized as a key
to successful transfer of learning, is likely to be hindered by a tight co-p
schedule. of
The important point is that technology transfer is not a single event,
but a series of events occurring over a period of time. Considerable
flexibility is possible in adjusting the transfer of programs and tech-
nology to meet delivery schedule requirements. Such adjustment, of
course, requires substantial and careful planning, but skillful planning
can minimize the impact of transfer on the rate of production. the
23Therelationship between co-production and the costs associated with the maii
rate of production depend on how the co-production program is organized. Recall cost
the equation C =f(x, V,T, m),andassume V is fixed. If T and m (the schedule) corn can be adjusted for the time required to transfer the program, or if no extra time
is required to effect the transfer, x is not affected by co-production. If, however, Fl
transfer takes time and T and m are fixed, x will have to increase. If we make the
usual assumptions about the relationship between C and x, there will be some
additionalindirect costs. andU.S. Space Technology Transfers to Japan 345
Turning to the indirect cost implications of the volume of production,
it should be kept in mind that we are concerned with the cost associated
with dividing a single program between two firms. The underlying deter-
minants of total cost are not at issue. Consequently, our interest in the
influence of production volume centers on the impact of co-production
on progress or learning curves. In the consideration of progress curves,
as Hirshleifer has pointed out, costs are influenced by two aspects of
volume: the actual output and the scheduled total output [9, pp. 239—
a 40]. Increasing familiarity with production processes should increase
a a labor-force productivity and thereby progressively lower unit costs [8,
pp. 146—47]. For this effect, it is the actual output that is important.
ate An increase in the scheduled volume of output will lead to different
'ro- managerial decisions about investment in facilities and tooling and to
unt different production procedures that should also lead to progressively
ck- lower unit costs [9, p. 240]. For this latter effect the scheduled output,
ier. rather than the actual output, is significant. Here, since actual and sched-
es- uled outputs were the same, we cannot distinguish between the two
situations. More generally, however, in analyzing the costs of transferring
the technology, it is important to specify whether actual or scheduled pro-
the duction is the measure.
'he Two interfirm comparisons of the volume-cost relationship are of
of interest. Assume that the first firm has a total cumulative production
:ey equal to N units. Also assume that the second firm is going to take on a
co-production program of n units. One comparison is between the cost
of the original producer's first n units and the second firm's costs for n
units. This comparison indicates (assuming all adjustments for other
cost effects such as economies of scale have been made and that the
firms are equally efficient) the extent to which the first firm's learning
of was transferred to the second firm.24
ng The second comparison is between the cost of n units produced by
the new manufacturer and the cost of units N to N + n, had they been
he manufactured by the original producer. This comparison indicates the
all cost impact of splitting the production run between two firms. The
comparisons will be considered in order.
For the first comparison, if the two firms have identical progress
he
tie 24L.E. Preston and E. C. Keachie discuss the relationship between learning








curves, no learning has transferred. If the licensee's unit cost is lower tage
for the first unit than that experienced by the first producer, or if his situi
curve shows a steeper "slope," 25thensome learning has been trans- licei
ferred. If the new firm's initial unit cost equals the licensing firm's unit ing
cost at the time of transfer, and if the slope of the progress curves for pros
both firms from that point on is the same, all learning has been trans-
ferred. trani
Figure 2 illustrates these relationships. Following the usual practice
in progress curve measurement, the figure shows direct labor hours per
aircraft as a function of total number of units produced. The line A-A and
represents the licensor's progress curve. Assume that a co-production The
program is established at point X after ten units have been produced by the i
the licensor. If all of the licensor's learning has been transferred, the than.
licensee's man-hour requirements for his first unit will correspond to U
those needed by the licensor for the eleventh unit. This 10-unit advan- LAC
requ
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25"Slope"has a meaning in progress-curve analysis different from its mathe-
Tb matical meaning. Here it refers to the ratio [c1/(c1/2)]100 where isthe produc-
tion cost of the tth unit of output.U.S.Space Technology Transfers to Japan347
wer tage would remain with the licensee throughout his production. This
his situation is shown by the progress curve B-C, which approaches the
tns- licensor's curve asymptotically. Of course, if none of the licensor's learn-
mit ing is transferred and interfirm differences are ignored, then the licensee's
for progress curve will be identical to that of the licensor.
ins- In most programs, some but not all of the licensor's learning will be
transferred. Thus, thelicensee'sinitialposition willlie somewhere
tice between A and B. Moreover, the slopes of the two curves may or may
per not converge in the manner shown, depending on differences in efficiency
-A and factor prices which have been ignored for the sake of illustration.
The important point, however, is that the transfer of learning results in
by the new producer requiring fewer man-hours for his initial production
the than were required by the original producer.
to Let us examine the F-104J in this manner. Early in the program,
an LAC officials made estimates of the direct manufacturing man-hours
required by MHI and KAC. LAC officials stationed in the Japanese
plants observed that these early estimates conformed reasonably well
to the actual man-hour expenditures of the two firms. Although these
early estimates have some speculative aspects, they provide a basis for
quantitative estimates of the amount of learning actually transferred.
In order to compare the Japanese and U.S. experience, some data had
to be adjusted in the following manner: we know that a number of air-
frame items were manufactured in the United States, and some were pur-
chased from Japanese vendors; both these factors must be accounted
for. We estimate the price of that part of the airframe produced at
Lockheed, which excludes equipment-purchase items,to be about
$520,000, or roughly two-thirds of the total airframe costs shown in
Table 4. Imports of hardcore airframe shown in Table 5 accounted for
approximately $38,000 per airframe. LAC officials estimate total imports
of airframe items to be approximately $50,000 per airframe. This, plus
an estimated $40,000 for airframe purchases from Japanese vendors,
shows us that approximately 17 per cent of the total airframe effort was
performed outside the MHI and KAC facilities. As shown in Table 12,
we can now estimate the total direct man-hours as 21 per cent more
ic-
thanthe amounts actually spent by MHI and KAC.
The Japanese data are now in a form that can be compared with





aEstimated by officials of LAC.
bEstimatedat 2 1per cent of the total MHI and KAC man-hours.
Total outside work was approximately $90,000 per unit. Exclusive of
equipment purchase items, LAC airframes cost about $520,000, and
90/(520-90) =21per cent.
choice is the first 160 F-lO4As and F-lO4Cs. However, the F-104J
airframe was at least 20 per cent heavier and in other ways differed
from U.S. versions. Indeed, on a cost-per-pound basis,as progress
curves are sometimes expressed, the Japanese experience would be
much more impressive than on the cost-per-plane basis used here. The
Lockheed production of F-lO4Gs or F-104J knockdowns might also be
introduced, but it would be difficult to adjust the data for learning
accumulated from previous models or for the assembly operations not
performed. Consequently, we have preferred to use the F-104A and
F-104C for the comparison even though doing so may understate the
U.S. cost relative to the Japanese cost. This means that any statistical
biases are in the direction of understating the interfirm transfer of learn-
ing.
LAC and MHI progress curves are shown in Table 13. For the first
10 F-104s produced by each firm, MHI used substantially fewer man-
hours than did LAC. The LAC man-hour rate per plane was slightly less
than the MHI rate per plane by the time each had completed 160 air-
craft. Direct man-hours used for the first 160 airframes by the Japanese
were only about 90 per cent of the total LAC man-hours for the first
160 F-104s built in the United States.
The relationship between the two learning curves is shown in Figure 3.
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Numbers of Aircraft FIO4C F-104J
1-10 (average) 101.0 764a
150-160 (average) 30,5 331a
1-160 (total) 7590.0 6880.0
aBasedon Lockheed estimates of MHI direct man-hours, inflated by
the ratio of total Japanese man-hours to MHI man-hours shown in Table
12 (6.88/3.98 =1.73).
FIGURE 3



































rate (78 per cent slope). However, the lower cost in Japan for the first
units meant that the total Japanese man-hour expenditure was lower Mi
than Lockheed's expenditure for the first 160 planes it produced. Aver. 16
age man-hours per plane for the first 160 produced by each firm were
43,000 for MHI and 47,400 for LAC. by
We are now in a position to answer the first of our two questions: COl
How much learning was transferred from LAC to MHI? If we assume
that the firms were equally efficient and that the rate of production and we
delivery schedule did not affect man-hour improvement, some summary
estimates can be made. F-.
One measure would be to assume that in the absence of a transfer of
learning, MHI would have had the same man-hours for the first unit as an
LAC had for its first unit. Actually, MHI's figure was about 25percent 23:
lower, or about the number of man-hours LAC used to produce the hoi
fourth plane.
On the other hand, one might take the entire 160-plane program as
1101
the basis. Since the rate of improvement for MHI was less than for LAC, tio
this gives a lower figure, about 10 per cent. The higher estimate of the .Jaj
amount of learning transferred seems the more reasonable one, con-
sidering the fact that the Japanese labor system results in high factory
manning levels. mi
Employment by a large Japanese firm implies a lifetime commitment. Nc
Therefore, one often observes more labor hours per unit of Japanese as
output than are technically required, or than are typically observed in
the United States. Probably more important, there are large differences tec
in wage rates between the United States and Japan. Differences by a the
factor of three are not uncommon in the "blue collar" aerospace skills, dir
Capital equipment is, if anything, more expensive in Japan, so it is not gra
surprising that the Japanese tend to use larger work forces to reduce idle the
equipment time. In general, because of different factor prices, we would
expect the Japanese to use more labor-intensive processes than do U.S.
firms. These considerations imply that more man-hours per plane would
be expended in Japan than in the United States, regardless of the
amount of learning transferred. mit
In short, it appears reasonable to conclude that a substantial amount
of learning was transferred—enough so that the man-hours used on the
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LAC F-104. For the program as a whole, the learning transferred saved
MHI about 10 per cent of the man-hours required by LAC for its first
160 aircraft.
Addressing the second comparison, i.e., between the man-hours used
by MHI and those that would have been required had the 160 F-lO4Js
come off the LAC assembly line, the problem is to compare the total
MHI man-hours for 160 aircraft (6.9 million) with the total LAC
would have required to produce an additional 160 aircraft. Based on
very limited data about the F-104G, the total output by LAC of all
f-104 models at the time of transfer, and LAC's rate of learning dis-
cussed earlier (78 per cent), we estimate that total LAC man-hours for
an additional 160 aircraft would have been 3.7 million, or about
23,000 man-hours per plane. On this basis it appears the MHI man-
hours were nearly twice what LAC would have required.26
Even if Japanese production did require perhaps twice as many man-
hours, total labor costs appear to have been lower. Although interna-
tional comparisons with Japanese labor rates are tricky, knowledgeable
Japanese officials believe that a good order of estimate might be about
one-third the U.S. rates. On the basis of the total cost data for the F-104J
program, this estimate appears slightly high, or else our estimate of the
man-hour requirements is slightly high, or most likely, both are high.
Nonetheless, the total cost figures to be discussed shortly indicate that
as orders of magnitude, these estimates are credible.
Technology transfer incurs not only direct costs, such as royalties and
technical assistance payments, but also the indirect costs associated with
the loss of economies of scale and with learning and scheduling. The
direct costs can be estimated with some precision. For the F-104J pro-
gram, for example, the direct costs amounted to about 7.8 per cent of
the price of the complete airframe and engine. Technical assistance
accounted for about a quarter of the direct costs.
Indirect costs are harder to estimate. Splitting production between
26 Actually, 87 per cent greater, were such computational accuracy warranted:
[(6.9 —3.7)/3.7]=87per cent. The estimate of Lockheed man-hours is under-
stated for two reasons. First, it assumes a constant progress-curve slope; the curve
might have flattened out. More important, with each new model of the F-104 at
Lockheed, the progress curve shifted upward. Undoubtedly, if the F-104J had
been produced in the United States the man-hours for the first J version plane
would have been higher than the end-point of Lockheed's F-104 progress curve





two sources can affect production rates, lot sizes, and schedules. Each
of these impacts affects production costs.
The production rate or economies-of-scale effects and the schedule
effects importantly govern the extent of the "hardcore" lists—the
ponents, parts, and materials imported. Extensive economies of scale
or tight delivery schedules imply larger amounts of imports.
Transplantation of technology will almost always entail some loss of
learning due to lower total quantities of production at any single loca- —
tion.This impact, however, can be lessened by the transfer of learning F-
from the original producer to the technology recipient. In the F-104J
program, it appears that between 10 per cent and 25 per cent of Lock-
heed's progress-curve advantage was transferred to Mitsubishi. T
Total cost of production
Let us now examine the total cost of F-lO4Js to the Japanese gov- dat
ernmentand compare it with the price Japan might have paid for
finished airplanes in the United States. sh
It is well known that the Japanese co-production programs required
more man-hours than would have been required in the United States. F-
It is also well known that certain parts and materials produced in Japan
COl
cost more than the U.S. counterparts. Furthermore, some investment
and set-up costs were incurred that could have been avoided by pur- fra
chasing from a "hot" production line. As a result, it has been commonly enj
assumed that the Japanese planes cost anywhere from 20 to 100 per pe:
cent more than they would have in the United States. The actual cost an
data for the F-i 04J program confute these common notions, however, all
In fact, no premium was paid. The Japanese obtained the planes at a
lower cost than they would have paid in the United States. wa
The high materials costs for the F-104J program appear to have been eq
more than offset by the lower labor costs in Japan. Although itis Th
impossible to estimate precisely the impact of the differences in factor St4
prices, the figures in Table 13 indicate that the factor-cost saving must an
have been large.
Table 14 shows that in Japan for 160 aircraft the cost for an airframe
was $620,000 as against a U.S. cost of $789,000 for an F-104G bought TI
in smaller lot sizes. For the engine, the Japanese cost was higher— of
$232,000 compared with $184,000. Adding these two totals gives an hg
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ach TABLE 14
Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Average Unit Production
lule Costs for F-104 Aircraft












all items of installed equipment other than electronics.
Includes payments to Lockheed for technical assistance, tools,
data, and cataloging shown in Table ii, allocated to 200 airframes.
clncludes payments to General Electric for technical assistance
shown in Table ii, allocated to 250 engines.
F-104J unit cost of $852,000—about seven-eighths the U.S. price of a
comparable plane.
The Japanese costs include technical assistance ($20,800 for air-
frame, $1,100 per engine); rights ($42,800 per airframe, $10,800 per
engine); tooling and start-up costs (direct costs were about $41,000
per airframe); and all other manufacturing costs. The unit-cost estimates
are therefore slightly exaggerated, because none of these costs are
allocated to the C-2 program or spare parts production. The only
identifiable cost not included is the fixed investment for the program; it
was omitted because LAC had some government-furnished plant and
equipment, and its facilities were used on programs other than the F-104.
Therefore, it was not clear what the corresponding figure for the United
States should be. Even leaving the F-104J costs unadjusted, however,
and allocating all fixed investment earmarked for the F-104J program,
the basic conclusion remains the same. Allocating the investment would
increase the airframe cost by $23,000 and the engine cost by $32,000.
This total increase of $55,000 would give a total figure for the F-104J
of $907,000. This is still approximately 10 per cent below the price Lock-

























Electronics are not included in the calculation for two reasons. First, tion of v
they were not co-produced in Japan during the C-i program, certainly are a
not in the sense that airframes and engines were co-produced. Second, the
the J and G versions of the F-104 differ substantially in electronics, even At
though the planes are essentially identical in terms of airframes and specific
engines. Since the C-i electronics were imported, they do not affect of gene
the cost comparison. ity.If
Differences in factor prices tend to cloud the issue. Nonetheless, quite require
apart from any beneficial effects to the Japanese aviation industry, it is relative






This paper has considered the costs of international transfers of the airl
sophisticated technology. The reasons for desiring such a transplantation Howev(
are outside the scope of this analysis, but a few comments are in order. tically
Most interfirm transfers, at least among firms in countries with developed technol
economies, occur because a firm perceives some profit advantage from ment iJ
establishing a local production capability [7]. Some transfers, of which
the cases considered here are examples, occur for reasons other than prints,
simple, short-run economic gain. The exportation of United States aero- Put
space technology to Japan in the 1950's and 1960's resulted from
Japan's military decisions and its political climate. There are military ance
advantages to local production of weapons, but even more important in are i
Japan's case was the political controversy over importation of weapons. In
Because the aircraft manufactured in Japan were regarded as Japanese are P
weapons, local support was generated for Japan's military strategy and and
force-level decisions.
It turned out, at least in the F-104J case, that the transfers were also
economically advantageous. The costs of the Japanese-produced F-lO4Js level
were at least 10 per cent less than the probable cost had Japan bought Te9
the aircraft off the Lockheed production line. The benefits perceived how,
when the decisions were made, however, were political rather than
economic.
Regardless of whether economic, political, social, or some mixture relatel
of factors lead a firm or government to consider substituting an importa- knowlU.S.Space Technology Transfers to Japan 355
First tion of technology for an importation of products, the costs of transfer
a factor in the decision and its outcome. These costs depend upon
bond the amount of technology transferred and the process of acquisition.
ever; At the start, costs depend on whether the transfer is limited to system-
specific and firm-specific knowledge, or whether a substantial amount
of general technology is required to establish the manufacturing capabil-
ity.If the firm or country already possesses the general technology
quite required to manufacture the product in question, transfer is likely to be
it is relatively inexpensive. Transfers involving substantial amounts of gen-
cally eral technology can be extremely expensive.
Even if the transplantation is limited to system-specific technology,
transfer is not an all-or-nothing matter. The ability to import com-
ponents, parts, and materials provides considerable flexibility in the
extent of transfer. In the F-104J case, for example, the technology for
of the airframe was. substantially transferred early in the C-i program.
tion However, the transfer of technology for the jet engine required prac-
•der. tically all the C-i program to complete, and little or no manufacturing
ped technology for the electronics gear was transferred. Japanese involve-
rom ment in electronics consisted of assembly of components and parts.
ich Transfer entails not only a movement of ideas in the form of blue-
han prints, drawings, and other data, but a movement of material and men.
Put differently, a transfer of manufacturing technology for a sophisticated
product usually involves a transfer of rights and data, a technical assist-
:ary ance program, and material support. The success and costs of a transfer
in are importantly influenced by the amount of each class of support.
In the rights and data area, tooling designs and related information
ese are particularly important. Much of the original producer's technology
tnd and learning advantages are embedded in his tools and the changes he
makes to these tools. Transfer of tooling data, therefore, not only is
iso essential to a technology transplantation, but it also influences the cost
us level that the new producer can achieve relative to the original producer.
lht Technical assistance is usually required since much technology, know-
'ed how, or learning is embodied in people rather than physical items. The
an amount and nature of technical assistance varied considerably in the
Japanese aerospace co-production programs. The differences were partly
related to the kind or amount of technology transferred. System-specific
ta- knowledge seemed to require much less personal contact than did firm-356 Case Studies
specific or general technology. In part, the differences appear to have
reflected differences in corporate attitudes towards technical assistance. ma
Since technical assistance accounts for a relatively small part of the
costs of transfer, however, generous provision of it would seem an
appropriate transfer tactic.
Material support may involve furnishing constructed tooling and other sh'
equipment, or it may be limited to hardcore imports of components, an
parts, and material. As we have seen, the hardcore list will contain items
with opposite characteristics: low-cost, simple, standardized items on the
one hand, and expensive, complex, and specialized items on the other.
Decisions about the composition of the hardcore list can obviously lead
to importing too much or too little technology, judged either by the
costs of transferring the technology or by the total costs of the resultant
products.
Costs of transfer are both direct and indirect. Direct costs include
royalties, technical assistance payments, and similar expenses. Indirect 196
costs occur because the establishment of a new production source affects
production rates, total quantities of production at a single location, and
schedules. Put differently, there are indirect cost impacts due to loss of
scaleor learning economies when production is divided into two loca-
tions. For the F-104J the direct costs amounted to about 7.8 per cent of
the sales price of the aircraft. Indirect costs are harder to estimate, but 27F
it is clear that much of their impact was lessened by a substantial trans-
fer of learning from Lockheed to Mitsubishi. Analysis of the progress
curves of the two firms indicates that between 10 per cent and 25 per
cent of Lockheed's accumulated learning was acquired by Mitsubishi as
partof the technology transfer.
The expense required to transplant knowledge is a major determinant Oxui
of international flows of technology. This case, study of interfirm transfers
of the manufacturing technology for a sophisticated product among
firms in countries with developed economies is, of course, only one of
many types of technology transfer. Intrafirm transfers by multinational
corporations, transfers from highly developed to less-developed coun- is
tries, and transfers of less sophisticated technologies, all have special Japa
cost characteristics different from those for the United States-Japanese
aerospace transfers in the 1950's and 1960's. Nonetheless, technology
1961
transfer will require a process basically similar to that described here.U.S. Space Technology Transfers to Japan357
have There will have to be transfers of rights, data, technical assistance, and
ance. material support. These will be direct costs involved in payments for
the these transfers, as well as indirect costs due to losses of advantages from
o an economies of scale and learning impacts. More knowledge about the
process for international transfers of technology and the cost relation-
)ther ships involved should enhance our understanding of international trade
ents, and investment and promote more effective public and private policies
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The Hall-Johnson paper contributes to our general understanding of
the elements of comparative advantage in a spectrum of industrial
'ans- activity. It analyzes the market structure and commercial considerations
967
influencing the cost and feasibility of technological transfer. The paper
ash- also deals with the research and skill component in an array of indus-
trial activity. The empirical evidence contained in the Hall-Johnson
the piece reinforces the view that Japan's ability to adapt and absorb foreign
￿07. technology has been a basic ingredient of its competitive advantage in
many areas of world trade. In our efforts to reformulate trade theory,
this type of knowledge helps us to understand the technological com-
ponent of traded goods and, more important perhaps, the ingredients of
technological advantage.
Several characteristics of the Hall-Johnson paper warrant special
mention. To begin with, not only does the paper deal with the required
production time, resources, and capabilities, but it has also broken down
the industrial product into components and parts. This is a significant
step beyond the usual analysis based upon standard industrial classifica-
tion product groups. Attention is drawn to the differences in technical
sophistication and optimal scale requirements within product families
and subassembly groups which affect comparative costs and manufactur-
ing capability. In my own studies of diesel engine manufacture and
automotive production,' I have found it is essential to analyze relative
costs and technical requirements at the component and parts level.
1ManufacturingProblems in India, Syracuse, 1967; and Automotive industries




Second, important distinctions are drawn in the paper among the diffiS
various kinds of received technology—general, system-specific, and and
firm-specific. Implicit in this categorization are certain technical and
commercial characteristics that affect both marketability as viewed by liniiu
private corporations and the related cost and feasibility of transfer. The
importance of these aspects are highlighted by Raymond Vernon, who
has drawn attention to corporate earnings at various phases in the prot1
product cycle, and A. T. Knoppers, who analyzes profit motivation in goocj
transferring "marketable technology." 2This,in part, is what is meant ity
by"market force analysis of international flows of technology"—a mar-
ket that has been structured by Japan's industrialization policies. The rn
need for general versus system-specific or firm-specific knowledge
depends upon the stage of sector development within each firm.
Resource costs and phase-in time are also a function of the stage of advai
industrial development. Japanese firms were apparently much further
of teq
advanced in general airframe manufacturing technology than in aircraft
th electronics. In the electronics field, there was extensive need for gen-
eral and system-specific knowledge as a prelude to the more costly and
d intricate firm-specific knowledge needed for actual production.
Firm-specific knowledge is an outgrowth of comparative development
UPOn
and experience. A longstanding policy of the Japanese government has
been to give special subsidy or financial support to technologically weak
be
sectors of the Japanese economy, and to expand or reinforce technical
capabilities at the plant level. For example, the Japanese Development a e
Bank finances projects to modernize plant equipment or develop new
product designs with a view toward "enhancing the Japanese economy's
mend
competitive position in world trade."
econd
A third point made in the Hall-Johnson paper relates to the corn- techri
ponents and parts that Japanese aircraft manufacturers continued to Tb
import rather than procure from local sources. These hardcore items
included (1)sophisticated components or subassemblies that were are
2RaymondVernon, "International Investment and International Trade in the
3
Product Cycle," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1966, pp. 190—207; versus Antonie T. Knoppers, "Development and Transfer of Marketable Technology in
the International Corporation: A New Situation in Applied Science and World A ed Economy" (paper presented to the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S.
House of Representatives for the Ninth Meeting of the Panel on Science and
1966 Technology, February 1968), Washington, D.C., 1968, pp. 63—72.
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the difficult or expensive to transfer to domestic firms (such as special pumps
and and valves and electronic guidance devices), and (2) simple items (such
and as bolts and rivets that would be costly to reproduce domestically in
by limited quantities). From such evidence, two important insights emerge.
The First, industrial goods entering world trade depend in part upon the
vho stage of development of the supply structure in overseas markets. Thus,
the protective tariffs nurture less efficient industries which displace industrial
in goods in world trade. Second, the development of local supplier capabil-
ant ity is a function of domestic capabilities to adapt and absorb foreign
ar- technology. David Granick points out that Soviet metal-working plants
in the 1930's had neither the technical skills nor the framework of
e industrial integration necessary to absorb the more advanced tech-
g
nologies then available from abroad.3 In short, Japanese comparative
f advantage is something much more than cheaper labor. It is a composite
er of technological know-how, scale economies, and production strategies—
ift the combination alluded to in Harry Johnson's illuminating "State of
the Theory."
Much can be drawn from a study of this type about the nature of
dynamic comparative advantage, the limitations of industrialization based
upon import substitution, and the development of the technological
ingredients for specialization in world trade. Defining the comparative
advantage range as a contribution to long-term economic growth has
been a topic of increasing concern in the field of development.4 The
technical and commercial considerations revealed in the Hall-Johnson
paper need to be viewed in the broader context of trade and develop-
ment policies which influence production costs and innovational environ-
S ments. Harry Johnson has drawn attention to the stultifying effects of
- economicnationalism which often inhibit the development of indigenous
technological capabilities.5
The Hall-Johnson paper draws attention to several other aspects
affecting development strategies. Implicit in the Japanese experience
are investments in research capabilities and technical skills to convert
3DavidGranick, Soviet Metal-Fabricating and Economic Development: Practice
versus Policy, Madison, Wisconsin, 1967.
Wilfred Malenbaum, et a!., "Comparative Costs and Economic Development,"
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1964, pp. 390—434.
Harry0. Johnson, Economic Nationalism in Old and New States, Chicago,
1966.
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and absorb imported technology. I found in my study of diesel engine
manufacture in India that the manufacturing capabilities that took less
than two years to transfer to Japan will take at least fifteen years in
India.6 This is because there is a severe shortage in India of the critical
engineering and technical skills that are much more abundant in Japan.
High engineer density in Japan acts as a major contributing factor to
the country's success in competing in world markets. Equally important
is the technical assistance rendered to small supplier plants by the
larger industrial firms in Japan. Foreign licensing regulations in Japan
have also contributed to their success in world trade.1
Another revealing point made in this case study of technological
transfer is the role played by multinational firms in imparting industrial
design and manufacturing techniques. Much depends upon their will-
ingness to share know-how, which is related to global marketing and
manufacturing strategies. But even more important than the imparting
of technical knowledge and manufacturing capabilities is the ability and
willingness to implant indigenous engineering and design capability for
continued technological transformation.8
JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Apropos the comment of Jack Baranson regarding the adaptability of
technology to local conditions, I would like to relate the example of
how a certain radio manufactured in India with the assembly-line method
turned out to contain several bugs in it because labor found it extremely
difficult to adapt itself to the "moving line." A technology which was
therefore appropriate to the transferring country was not optimal when
6SeeBaranson, Manufacturing Problems in India, pp. 68—69.
7TerutomoOzawa, Imitation, innovation, and Trade: A Study of Foreign
Licensing Operations in Japan, University Microfilms, 1967.
8JackBaranson, "Transfer of Technical Knowledge by International Corpora-
tions to Developing Economies," American Economic Review, Papers and Pro-
ceedings, May 1966, Pp. 259—67; see also Baranson, Automotive Industries in







appliedto the recipient country with different qualities in its labor force
(although, given time, the labor force could almost certainly be trained
in up to the required level of discipline).
al This example, in turn, raises the question as to why it was that such
a. a technological transfer, presumably inefficient from an economic point
to of view, did not "lose out" in the competitive struggle. Or to put it in
an alternative way, should economists really worry about such inefficient
transfersif the market will make sure that they are eliminated by
efficient transfers through the working of the market mechanism? In
the Indian case, any such inefficient transfers showed surprising capacity
a tosurvive because the recipient country's policies frustrated the working
of the market mechanism rather directly. Import controls prevented
competition from abroad (through importation of competitively pro-
duced radios) whereas domestic restrictions on entry of new firms, via
industrial licensing, prevented the emergence of more efficient rivals
with superior technological processes. Thus, the existence of inefficient
r governmental policies elsewhere made it possible for firms to get away
with importing inferior technologies. This conclusion, of course, begs the
question as to why inferior technology should have been imported at
all if better technology were available. In assessing this question, the
facts that the market for sale of technology is imperfect and that infor-
mation about alternatives not readily available are relevant.
Thus, in the end, the relevant questions seem to me to boil down to,
not whether technology does get transferred at all, but whether the
market for such transfers is perfect and, if it is not (in some defined
sense), what is the pattern of optimal intervention that is called for. If
the authors of the interesting paper on the transfer of aero-technology
to Japan had focused on this question, we should have had answers of
considerably greater interest to economists.
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